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The political consequences of the
product cycle: industrial history
and political outcomes
James R. Kurth

The public policies of major industries: the contemporary conflict
What explains the continuing stagnation in the industrial economies of
the West? What will be the impact of such stagnation upon domestic politics
and upon international relations? Are there domestic and foreign policies
which the state can undertake to bring about a return to sustained economic
prosperity and a recapitulation of that lost golden age of 1948-1973? These are
now the central questions for scholars in the emerging field of international
political economy. A recent special issue of International Organization, edited
by Peter Katzenstein, has presented some of the most useful and sophisticated
approaches to these questions and analyses of the international political
economy of the West during the period of the last thirty years. 1
These questions are, of course, also the central ones for major economic
actors such as industrial corporations and financial institutions. And here we
can distinguish five different answers or solutions to the problem of economic
The preparation of this article was facilitated by a year spent at the Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, New Jersey, and by discussions there with Albert Hirschman. I have also
benefited from comments by Thomas Ferguson, Peter Gourevitch, and Martin Shefter.
1 Peter J. Katzenstein, editor, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of
Advanced Industrial States, a special issue of International Organization 31, 4 (Autumn 1977). A
systematic and perceptive review of recent literature on one theme of the new international
political economy, the impact of international economics upon domestic politics, is given in Peter
Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,"
International Organization 32, 4 (Autumn 1978).
International Organization 33,l, Winter 1979
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International Organization

stagnation. Each is preferred and supported by a particular cluster of industries or banks, and each has particular implications for domestic and
foreign policies.
The most minimal solution to economic stagnation, in the sense that it
requires the least change from government policies of recent years, is the conventional Keynesian one of government-induced demand-creation. This approach is preferred by the consumer-durables industries, the most important
of which is the automobile industry. A familiar variation is government spending on weapons procurement and government support of weapons exports;
this approach of mutant or military Keynesianism is preferred by the aerospace industry. The two variations on a Keynesian theme, supported by the
two leading industries of the long prosperity of 1948-1973 which contributed
so much to the acceptance of Keynes' ideas, in turn favor the continuation of
the existing system of international free trade. Unfortunately, however, these
two Keynesian approaches to economic stagnation are so minimal that they are
already perceived by other economic sectors as inadequate for their needs.
A third approach requires greater change from past priorities: systematic
restraint or reduction of industrial wages and welfare benefits, in order to
increase the rate of profit and thus the amount of capital available for reinvestment in industry to make it more competitive in the world market. This
approach, once known as deflation and now often associated with the ideas of
Milton Friedman, is preferred by the large commercial banks heavily engaged
in international operations. And, of course, this approach also favors the continuation of the existing system of international free trade.
The fourth approa,ch would be rather more radical: it would displace the
system of international free trade with one of "organized free trade," i.e.,
international cartels, or even with one of vigorous protection of national
industries with tariffs and quotas against imports. This, its advocates claim,
would permit sufficient capital formation to make the protected industries
efficient once again. This approach, which has been called neomercantilism, is
of course the one preferred by the oldest industries, in particular the textile,
steel, and chemical industries of Europe and America.
The above four solutions focus on preservation of existing industries. A
fifth, rather different approach is possible, which focuses on the creation of
new industries or indeed new leading sectors whose rapid growth would lift up
the entire economy behind them, much as the automobile industry did in
America in the 1920s and in Europe in the 1950s-1960s. And since the nation
which introduces a new industry has a natural advantage in the world market
for a decade or even for a generation, industrial innovation would also ·favor
the continuation of the system of international free trade. This approach
draws upon that other great economist of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter, who
saw the advantages of "gales of creative destruction," i.e. depressions, which
pruned the economy of overinvestment in old industries and cleared the way
for investment in new ones, but whose ideas were eclipsed by Keynes' during
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the long prosperity of 1948-1973. 2 By its nature, its advocates would be found
among new, growing industries, such as telecommunications, rather than
mature, established ones, and among investment banks, rather than commercial ones.
The politics of the next few years, then, will involve the conflict between
these alternative solutions to economic stagnation and the conflict between the
different industries that support them. But it will not be the first time that
politics in major industrial countries have been shaped by the public policies of
major industries and by the conflicts between them.
This essay seeks to add a historical dimension to the analysis of the
political impact of different industries. It examines the political tendencies of
three successive leading sectors in Europe and America over the last two
centuries-textiles, steel, and automobiles. Each of these has been the largest
industry for several major industrial nations in the West at one time or
another. Of course, there have been other industries which have also formed
major economic sectors in particular countries at particular times, for example, the chemical and electrical industries in Germany, which we will also
discuss, and the aerospace industry in the United States. Nevertheless, from
the overall perspective of comparative economic history, the textile, steel, and
automobile industries assume an especially prominent place.
Each of these three industries has gone through what could be seen as a
life cycle of growth, stagnation or saturation, and decline in the major countries of Europe and in the United States. The process has been similar to one
which Raymond Vernon has analyzed in his studies of contemporary transnational enterprises and which he has termed the product cycle. 3 In Vernon's
concept the product cycle consists of four phases:
1. Innovation of a product and growth of its sales in the domestic

market.
2. Saturation of the domestic market and export of the product to
foreign markets. Exports will go first to those countries whose demand structures (e.g., national income per capita) are most similar to
that in the home country. When these markets in turn are saturated,
the export drive will move on to countries whose demand structures
are less similar.
3. Manufacture of the product within foreign markets, i.e., direct foreign investment. Again, investment will go first to those countries
2 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of
the Capitalist Process, two volumes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
• Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New
York: Basic Books, 1971). An earlier formulation of the idea of certain patterns or cycles in the
development of industries can be found in Walther G. Hoffmann, The Growth of Industrial
Economies, translated by W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1958).
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whose supply structures (e.g., factors of production) and demand
structures are most similar to those in the home country and later to
countries whose supply structures are less similar. Within the home
country, the manufacture of the product reaches a plateau.
4. Export of the product from foreign countries into the original home
market. Eventually, indeed, there will be export of the product from
the latest foreign countries to manufacture it into not only the original
home market but also into other foreign countries which had once
been the latest manufacturers. Within the home country and these
other earlier producers, the manufacture of the product goes into
decline.

These four phases describe very well the life cycle of the automobile industry in the United States and in the countries in Western Europe. But the life
cycles of the textile industry and the steel industry have also been variations on
the same theme. The textile and steel industries rarely engaged in direct foreign
investment in manufacturing, phase 3, but each passed through the other three
phases. And in the steel industry there was the functional equivalent of phase 3
with indirect foreign investment, the financing of the foreign railroads which
were the major final consumer of the home steel industry. In addition, as we
shall see, the steel industry passed through its own peculiar phase, that of
government procurement of its products for military purposes.
In his own work, Vernon has not extensively examined the consequences
of the product cycle for major political outcomes. However, Robert Gilpin, in
a major, pathbreaking book, has drawn on the concept of the product cycle,
expanded it into the concept of the growth and decline of entire national
economies, and analyzed the relations between this economic cycle, national
power, and international politics. 4
In this essay, we will pursue these themes of Vernon and Gilpin by examining some of the political consequences of the industrial life cycles of textiles, steel, and automobiles over the last two centuries. In general, the major
consequences of the domestic growth phase of an industry have been for
domestic politics, including the nature of political regimes. Conversely, the
major consequences of the later phases, those of foreign exports and foreign
investments, have been for foreign policies. For the textile industry and the
steel industry, our focus will be on the major countries of Europe; for the
automobile industry, we will widen our focus to include the United States.
Of course, many of the political outcomes that we will discuss have been
enormously complex in their causes and can hardly be adequately explained by
industrial factors alone. The rise of the liberal state in the nineteenth century,
the "new imperialism" of the 1870s-1890s, the Anglo-German naval race
• Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of
Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
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before World War I, the coming to power of Hitler in 1933, and the political
stability of Western democracies in the thirty years after World War II-these
momentous events have each been the subject of an enormous and sophisticated historical literature, rich in an array of competing explanations, and
many readers will disagree with the particular interpretation offered here. We
make no claim that our analysis provides a full explanation and understanding
of these historical phenomena. It is our suggestion, however, that the industrial factor has a consistency over time and a commonality over space that
gives it a special value as an explanatory approach.

The political tendency of the textile industry

The domestic growth phase
In almost all countries, the first stage in industrialization has been the
creation of a textile industry. This has required the mobilization of relatively
modest amounts of capital, modest, that is, in relation to the amount of
capital already available in the country as a result of pre-industrial enterprises
and also modest in relation to the amount of capital that has been needed for
the creation of later industries, such as steel, railroads, chemicals, automobiles, and aerospace. Consequently, the textile industries of Europe (and also
of the United States and the most advanced countries of Latin America) were
created for the most part by family firms, and the industries grew through the
reinvestment of their earnings. In contrast with later industries, the capital accumulation for textile industrialization could be accomplished largely without
dependence upon financing from banks, the state, or foreign investors. 5
The lack of dependence upon financing from banks had important consequences for the development of financial institutions. The financial agencies
that grew up around the textile industry were clearing houses and commercial
banks engaged in short-term credits to merchants. They were not investment
houses and industrial banks engaged in long-term credits to industry. Those
banks that did engage in long-term credits at the time did so with loans to
governments, not to industries.
• E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1962); also the country studies in Carlo M. Cipolla, editor, The Emergence of Industrial
Societies (London: Collins, Fortana Books, 1973). Statistics on the growth of the textile industry
in European countries can be found in B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 427-436; and in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 780-788.
Three useful overall accounts of European industrialization, from contrasting perspectives, are
David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development
in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969);
Tom Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth Century Europe (London: Longman, 1969); and
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960;
second edition, 1971), elaborated in his The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1978). In his works, Rostow develops and employs at length the concepts of the leading sector.
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The lack of dependence of the textile industry upon financing from the
state also had important consequences for the development of political institutions. The capital accumulation for textile industrialization could be accomplished largely without state intervention, except for the elimination of
barriers to a free market within the national boundaries (e.g., internal tariffs)
and for the erection of external tariffs on occasion for the protection of the
"infant industry." Textile manufacturers did not want the dynastic-authoritarian state of the past, and they did not need the technocratic-authoritarian
state of the future. Rather, the textile manufacturers in Europe in the first half
of the nineteenth century were opposed to many of the traditional activities of
the state. They did not want the internal tariffs, the consumer taxes, and the
tedious regulations of the absolutist monarchies, which prevented the
manufacturers from selling their goods in a nationwide market. And they did
not want the local guild monopolies and local welfare systems, which also
prevented them from drawing their labor from a nationwide market. 6 Similarly, the commercial banks wanted an end to restrictions on the free movement of capital. To systematically eliminate the traditional impediments to
free movement of goods, labor, and capital, however, the textile manufacturers and commercial bankers needed institutionalized representation at the
national center of power. To achieve this they needed ''the supremacy of
parliament," ideally within "the liberal state." But the textile manufacturers
did not need the assistance of the state to mobilize large amounts of investment
capital; nor did they yet need its assistance to demobilize large numbers of
socialist workers, services that would later be performed by such diverse
authoritarian governments as those of Napoleon III in France, Bismarck in
Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Primo de Rivera and Franco in Spain.
The liberal state, with parliamentary supremacy and with property suffrage, was the most finely-tuned solution to the problems of the textile industry (and of other industries producing light consumer goods such as shoes)
and of commercial banking. The liberal state gave them the abolition of
traditional barriers to trade; parliamentary supremacy meant that they would
be represented at the center of national power; and property suffrage meant
that only they and the traditional elites would be so represented. As such, there
was, in the familiar phrase of Max Weber (and of Goethe before him), an
"elective affinity" between the textile industry, commercial banking, and such
a regime. The political theory of the coalition between the textile industry and
commercial banking was summed up by Thomas Macaulay in 1830:
Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the nation by confining
themselves strictly to their legitimate duties, by leaving capital to find its
most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their national reward, idleness and folly their natural punish• Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963),
chapters I-III; Hobsbawm, op. cit., chapter 2.
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ment, by maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the
price of law, and by observing strict economy in every department of the
state. Let the government do this, the people will do the rest. 7
We should not overemphasize the actual consequences of this elective
affinity between textiles and liberals, however, for in Europe the political impact of the textile industry varied from one country to another according to
when the country industrialized and to how the industry fit into the international market.

The British model
The connection between textile industrialization and the liberal institutions was most obvious in the first industrializer, Britain, which in the early
nineteenth century was simultaneously "the workshop of the world," "the
mother of parliaments,'' and the center of ''Manchester liberalism.' ' 8 The textile industry also had a major political impact in the second wave of
industrializers, that is, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, each of which experienced rapid growth in the industry in the 1820s. The textile manufacturers
were a major force in the Revolutions of 1830 in each of these three countries
(as they were in the related conflict over the Great Reform Bill in Britain in
1830-1832). And they were a major force in the establishment arid support of
the succeeding liberal regimes: the Orleanist Monarchy in France (the "Bourgeois Monarchy" or monarchie censitaire), the new and similar monarchy in
now-independent Belgium, and the new regimes in the most industrialized
cantons of Switzerland. 9
In Britain, France, and Belgium prior to textile industrialization, the old
absolutist monarchy had been displaced and the landed aristocracy had been
diminished in power by revolutionary upheavals at one time or another. This
meant that the textile industry could grow up in a relatively open political
space, at least compared with the countries to the East and the South, and that
it was easier for it to achieve its political aims.
In addition, the textile industries in the early industrializers were relatively
competitive in the international market. This was most obviously true of Britain, "the workshop of the world," but even France, Belgium, and Switzerland were successful in selected international textile markets. This meant that
for textile manufacturers in these countries, there was no conflict between the
economic and the political parts of liberalism, between free trade and civil
liberties. Again, this made it easier for the textile industry to develop a
7 Quoted in Frederick B. Artz, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
• E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Making of Modern Society, Vol. JI, 1759 to the
Present Day (New York: Pantheon, 1968), chapters 3-4; William Langer, Political and Social
Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), chapters II-III.
• Langer, op. cit., chapters III-IV; Artz, op. cit., chapters VIII, IX; B. M. Biucchi, "The
Industrial Revolution in Switzerland,'' in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 627-652.
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coherent vision and then to develop, in Gramsci's sense, an ideological hegemony. The most dramatic example was the dominance of the doctrine of Manchester liberalism in Britain.

The Prussian mutation
The political impact of the textile industry was very different in the next
or third wave of industrializers, Prussia and Austria, which experienced rapid
growth in the industry only in the 1840s-1850s. Here, the Napoleonic Wars
had displaced neither the old landed aristocracy nor its ally, the absolutist
monarchy. Accordingly, the textile industry grew up in a relatively closed
political space, cramped and contained by a well-entrenched agrarian upper
class. 10
One consequence was that textile industrialization in the East
(1840s-1850s) was somewhat delayed from when it might have occurred and
later than that in the West (1820s-1830s, even earlier in Britain). Yet, certain
social groups in the East, in particular, students, professors, and lawyers, imported liberal ideas from the West during the Napoleonic Wars and the Restoration. The result was that a gap opened up between liberalism and industrialization. In the East in the 1810s-1830s, liberalism was a movement
without much of a social base-what William Langer has called "the
liberalism of the intellectuals" rather than the liberalism of the
manufacturers. 11 At this point liberalism outpaced industrialization.
A second, later consequence was that when textile industrialization did
occur, the textile manufacturers would not be strong enough relative to the
agrarian upper classes to impose their political vision on the rest of society.
The new "infant industry" in the East was highly vulnerable in its domestic
markets to competition from the older established textile manufacturers in the
West, and accordingly the Eastern manufacturers were highly protectionist in
regard to international trade policies. These features of the textile industry in
the East diminished its liberal impulse and impact. The 1840s to the 1860s were
the high point of liberal movements in the history of the Hohenzollern and
Habsburg monarchies, yet liberal institutions never achieved the strength that
they had in the West. At this point the gap between liberalism and industrialization continued but was reversed: industrialization outpaced
liberalization.
Indeed, from the 1820s to the 1860s, the political economies of Britain
and Prussia were almost mirror images. British textiles were competitive in the
international market, while British grain was not. Conversely, Prussian grain
was competitive in the international market, while Prussian textiles were not.
10 On industrialization in Prussia and Austria, see Knut Borchandt, "The Industrial Revolution
in Germany 1700-1914" and N. T. Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Habsburg
Monarchy 1750-1914," in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 76-156, 228-276.
11 Langer, op. cit., chapter IV.
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Thus British textile manufacturers favored both free trade and liberal institutions, and British grain producers favored neither. Prussian textile manufacturers favored liberal institutions but not free trade, and Prussian grain
producers favored free trade but not liberal institutions. The fact that British
textile manufacturers could impose free trade upon British grain producers
(the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846) reinforced the social power of
political liberals. Conversely, the fact that Junker grain exporters could impose free trade upon Prussian textile manufacturers (the low-tariff policy of
the Zollverein) reinforced the social power of political conservatives. In Britain, economic liberalism worked to reinforce political liberalism; in Prussia,
economic liberalism worked to undermine it. 12

The Latin pattern
The political impact of the textile industry was very different again in the
next or fourth wave of industrializers (Italy, Spain, and Portugal). Here, textile industrialization was delayed for a generation after that of Germany and
Austria, two generations after that of France, Belgium, and Switzerland, and
more than three generations after that of Britain. The countries of Latin
Europe are thus the first severe case of "underdevelopment" or "dependent"
industrialization. 13
But like the East, the South also imported liberal ideas from the West during the Napoleonic Wars and the Restoration. Indeed, the first use of the term
"Liberal" for a political group was in Spain in 1810, in the Constituent Cortes
at Cadiz. Unlike the East, however, the social base of liberalism in the South
also included military officers and bureaucratic officials, primarily because the
old legitimate monarchies at the apex of the military and bureaucratic
organizations had been displaced during the Napoleonic invasions. With such
a social base, Southern liberalism was stronger than Eastern liberalism, whose
social base was confined to intellectuals, but weaker than Western liberalism,
whose social base included textile manufacturers. However, the absence of a
new cohesive industrial class, the absence of the old cohesive agrarian class,
and absence of the old legitimate monarchy combined to mean that for Latin
Europe this was a period when no social group could exercise political authority, a period of military coups, popular revolts, and civil wars.
When textile industrialization did occur, the textile manufacturers could
grow up in rough coequality with the agrarian upper classes. And this by the
mid-1870s eventually issued in political stability and a special kind of liberal
state, one based on a policy of tariff protection for both textiles and
12 The economic basis of the contrast between Britain and Prussia is one theme discussed in
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
13 On industrialization in Italy and Spain, see Luciano Cafagna, "The Industrial Revolution in
Italy 1830-1914" and Jordi Nadal, "The Failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain
1830-1914," in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 279-325, 532-620.
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agriculture, a marriage of cloth and wheat comparable to the contemporary
''marriage of iron and rye'' in Bismarck's Germany. 14

The foreign export phase
The British textile industry was the first to move into the second phase,
the domestic stagnation phase, of the industrial life cycle. When the British
textile industry reached the saturation point in its British markets and "the
falling rate of profit," its natural, because minimal, response was to simply
continue its old activity in a new place, i.e. it shifted from the selling of textiles
in Britain to the selling of textiles in Europe. By the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, 50-70 percent of British textile production each year was sold abroad.
This was the motor behind the British foreign policy of free trade.
As the European market in turn became saturated, the textile industry shifted to the selling of textiles in Latin America. Here was the motor
behind the British support of, and occasional intervention in, the
Latin-American Wars of Independence. This combination of free trade and
gunboat diplomacy would later be termed by John Gallagher and Ronald
Robinson ''the imperialism of free trade.'' 15 It probably reached its apogee in
the Opium War of 1842, near the end of the severe depression of 1837-1843. 16
The transnational enterprise of this era of free trade was the trading company,
the largest being the East India Company. The foreign policy of the British
textile industry was summed up, again by Thomas Macaulay, in 1833:
It would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the

people of India were well-governed and independent of us, than
ill-governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their own kings,
but wearing our broadcloth, and working with our cutlery, than that they
were performing their salaams to English collectors and English magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy, English
manufactures. To trade with civilized men is infinitely more profitable
than to govern savages. 17
The success of British textiles in the international market led to the reinforcement of the British banking system of clearing houses, commercial
14 On Italian politics during the nineteenth century, see Arthur James Whyte, The Evolution of
Modern Italy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1%5); and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern
History, revised edition (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969). On Spanish politics, see
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the
Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); and Joan Connolly Ullman, The
Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1%8).
1 • John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," in George H.
Nadel anc;I Perry Curtis, editors, Imperialism and Colonialism (New York: Macmillan, 1964).
1 • E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chapter 7.
17 Quoted in Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (Cleveland: World Publishing,
1963), p. 234.
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banks, short-term credits, and now to insurance companies and to the expansion of its operations into the world arena. This kind of banking system, with
its peculiar combination of short-term time horizons and worldwide space
horizons, would have important implications for British domestic and foreign
policies in later years.
There was another possible response to the saturation of domestic
markets, however. That was to shift investment capital into a new industry, in
this case the iron and steel industry and the railroads. This British investors did
in the 1840s, and the result was the British boom of the 1850s. This choice between response one and response two, between foreign expansion and
technological innovation, between producing an old commodity for a new
country and producing a new commodity for the old country, was a crucial
one. And the same crucial choice reappears as each new leading sector reaches
its eventual and inevitable maturity and decline.
The textile industries of the other major European countries reached the
saturation points of their own domestic markets at various times during the
last three decades of the nineteenth century. The normal response of each
country was to search for new markets in underdeveloped countries, particularly in a nation's colonial territories where the products of the national
textile industry had a natural or even legal (e.g., tariffs) advantage over the
products of foreign competitors. This drive for new colonial markets was one
of the causes of "the new imperialism" of the late nineteenth century, including "the scramble for Africa" in the 1880s. But the textile industry by
itself does not explain much about colonial policy. A more powerful engine
propelling the new imperialism was the domestic stagnation phase of the steel
industries of Europe.

The political tendency of the steel industry

The domestic growth phase
The second stage in the industrialization of a country normally has been
the creation of a steel industry and the related creation of those industries
which are the final consumers of steel-railroads, shipbuilding, and, in the
twentieth century, automobiles.
The creation of a country's steel industry and its crucial consumer in the
nineteenth century, the railroads, required the mobilization of far larger
amounts of capital than that required in the creation of the textile industry.
This distinction between the capital required for textile industrialization and
that required for steel and railroad industrialization is one aspect of the
distinction that Alexander Gerschenkron drew between early industrialization
and late industrialization. 18 Gerschenkron argued that in the late in18 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962).
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dustrializers the need to mobilize large amounts of capital led to the need for
financing by large investment banks or even by the state. This in turn led the
investment banks to organize industrial cartels to prevent competition between
the recipients of their investments. The complex of cartelized industry and industrial banks then was well-positioned to shape state policies. Or when the
state itself undertook the financing of industrialization, it led to authoritarian
measures. In Gerschenkron's view it was no accident that the late industrializers, in particular Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia were
or eventually became authoritarian states. Guillermo O'Donnell has reached
similar conclusions in analyzing Latin-American countries. O'Donnell argued
that in these still later industrializers the move from the consumer-goods stage
of industrialization into the capital-goods stage of industrialization generates
severe balance of payments problems, the need to mobilize large amounts of
capital, and again the turning of economic and technocratic elites to the solution of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime, as in Brazil in 1964 and in
Argentina in 1966. 19
The actual evidence for the causal connection between the steel industry
and authoritarian politics is rather mixed. In the first industrializer, Britain,
the mobilization of capital for the second stage of industrialization occurred
without any dramatic change in financial institutions or in state intervention.
Indeed, the mobilization of capital for the British iron and steel industry and
for the British railroads was achieved about as easily and as incrementally as
the mobilization of capital for the British textile industry. But in Britain the
ease of capital mobilization for iron, steel, and railroads was itself a consequence of the prior overwhelming success of British textiles in foreign markets,
which generated large profits and large amounts of capital for investment in
new enterprises. From the 1820s to the 1850s, textile exports normally formed
40-60 percent of Britain's exports each year. 20
In France, the pattern was somewhat different. After a slow growth of the
iron industry and of railroads before 1848, France experienced rapid growth in
these sectors in the 1850s and 1860s. It is an oft-told tale that this rapid growth
required new financial institutions, such as investment banks (e.g., the Credit
Mobilier of the Pereire brothers); in turn, these new investment banks, it is
said, needed the support of a strong state (i.e., the Second Empire of Napoleon III, 1852-1870) to break the power of the traditional banks. 21 Indeed, a
1• Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in
South American Politics (Berkeley: International Studies, University of California, Berkeley,
Politics of Modernization Series No. 9, 1973).
20 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chapters 6 and 7. A useful overall account of the growth
and impact of the European iron and steel industries and railroads is Hobsbawm's The Age of
Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975).
11 See, for example, Gerschenkron, op. cit., and Rondo E. Cameron, France and the Economic
Development of Europe, 1800-1914, Conquests of Peace and Seeds of War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), chapter IV.
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good case can be made that the first in the endless parade of modern bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes was the French Second Empire.
The Third Republic, which replaced the Second Empire after its defeat in
the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, was not an authoritarian regime. Yet in the
1880s it organized and supported, through the Freycinet Plan, another major
expansion of the French steel industry and the French railroads. 22 This casts
doubt on the argument that steel and railroad industrialization in France required an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, just as in Britain in the
first half of the nineteenth century, so too in France in the 1880s, the export of
textiles provided the capital to finance the expansion in iron, steel, and railroads. During this period, textile exports normally formed 30-50 percent of
France's exports each year. In Britain, the expansion was financed by British
domination of the international markets for low-price cotton goods; in
France, the expansion was financed by French domination of the international
market for high-quality goods, especially woolen ones. It was France's special
vocation in the quality products of the last stage of the pre-industrial era
which eased its transition through the second stage of the industrial
revolution-and made it easier to do without the discipline of another
authoritarian regime. 23
In Germany, the path to steel and railroad industrialization was very different from that in either Britain or France. At the time Prussia and then Germany undertook this second stage of industrialization, it had achieved no
dominance of the world market for any product of the first stage, that of textiles. Accordingly, there was an absence of large profits from foreign trade and
thus of large amounts of capital to be invested in steel and railroads. There was
therefore a need for new kinds of financial institutions, specifically industrial
investment banks or state enterprises. 24 And there was also a relatively open
space in the German financial system within which these new institutions grew
and indeed reached a dominant position. As in Britain where the weakness of
the agrarian elites had permitted the textile industry and commercial banking
to grow up unconfined and to eventually dominate the political system, so too
in Germany the weakness of the textile industry and commercial banking
(itself due to the strength of the agrarian elites, the Junkers) permitted the steel
industry and industrial banking to grow up unconfined and eventually to
dominate.
By the end of the long prosperity of 1850-1873, sometimes known as the
22 Sanford Elwitt, The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 1868-1884
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), introduction and chapter I.
2 • William Woodruff, "The Emergence of an International Economy, 1700-1914," in Cipolla,
op. cit., pp. 673-674.
2• See, for example, Gerschenkron, op. cit., and Cameron, op. cit., chapter IV. A useful and
detailed discussion of the relationships between economics and politics in Germany under Bismarck is presented by Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the
German Empire (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977).
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great railroad boom, Britain and Germany had each institutionalized the
respective methods by which they had passed through the first and second
stages of industrialization. Britain represented the overdevelopment of the
first stage of the industrial revolution, composed of the textile industry and
commercial banking. Germany represented the overdevelopment of the second
stage of the industrial revolution, composed of the steel industry and industrial
banking. Even more, however, Germany represented the overdevelopment of
the coalition between the last stage of the pre-industrial era, that of commercialized agriculture, and the second stage of the industrial one-what was to
become in 1879 the famous "marriage of iron and rye." France took a middle
position between the two, having a political economy more balanced between
the agricultural, the textile, and steel sectors, between domestic and foreign
markets, and between commercial and investment banking.
In Britain, France, and Germany, the iron and steel industry and the railroads developed together, as a sort of "steel-rail complex." In Italy and
Spain, however, this nexus was severed. The major railroads of Latin Europe
were built with rails and rolling stock imported from Britain and France and
were financed with capital loaned by British and French investment banks. 25
The result was railroadization without steel industrialization. Since the capital
mobilization for the railroads of Latin Europe came from foreign investors
rather than from the national government, from abroad rather than from
above, no dramatic reorganization of the state was necessary. It is not surprising, therefore, that the construction of the railroads of Italy and Spain in
the mid- and late-nineteenth century could coexist with the conservation of
their liberal institutions and parliamentary systems.
Italy did construct a substantial steel industry in the 1900s, however.
(Spain would not do so until after World War II.) But, as in Britain and in
France in earlier times, the necessary capital mobilization in Italy was made
possible by the export of textiles. In Italy's case, it was Italian domination of
the international market for high-quality silk products. It was also another
case where the second stage of the industrial revolution was financed by the
achievements of the last stage of the pre-industrial era. 26
Most later steel industrializers, such as Spain, Brazil, and Argentina,
lacked the capability to dominate the international market for a particular industrial product. This led them into severe balance of payments difficulties
(even though they were exporters of agricultural products), once they tried to
move from the stage of textile or "import-substitution" industrialization to
the stage of steel or capital-goods industrialization. The conjunction of the
need to mobilize large amounts of capital and severe balance of payments
deficits leading to devaluations and severe inflation created an influential constituency among economic, bureaucratic, and technocratic elites in support of
2 ' Cameron, op. cit., W. 0. Henderson, Britain and Industrial Europe: 1750-1870: Studies in
British Influence on the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, third edition (London: Leicester
University Press, 1972).
2 • Cafagna, op. cit., pp. 289-290, 302-325.
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an authoritarian regime. In contrast with a liberal, parliamentary system, an
authoritarian regime was better able to destroy labor unions, repress wages
and consumer demand, and thus squeeze capital out of the working class in
order to finance the new capital-goods sector.

The foreign export phase and the naval procurement phase:
from the Great Depression of 1873-1896 to World War I
The most pronounced impact of the steel industry upon political outcomes came, not in its phase of domestic growth, but in its phase of domestic
stagnation, that is, after steel production reached saturation in its home
markets, and the industry turned to foreign ones. And because the responses
of Britain to this phase in the nineteenth century can be seen as prototypes of
many American industrial policies in the mid-twentieth century, we shall
discuss the British experience at some length. 27

Britain
The British iron industry (it would not become a steel industry proper until the adoption of the Bessemer process in the 1860s) and the associated railroads fueled the British boom of 1851 to 1857. A brief depression from 1857 to
1859 led the British to push for a series of international treaties to promote free
trade, such as the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 between Britain and
France. The 1860s were relatively prosperous. During this period some banks
of the City of London began the large-scale financing through bonds of railroads on the Continent, many of them built with British rails and British
equipment. 28
By the beginning of the 1870s, however, railroad-building in Britain had
reached the saturation point, and to a lesser degree the same was true of Britain's railroad-building on the Continent. An economic historian (who later
went on to other things) once asked "What happened when the railroads were
built?" 29 His answer was "the Great Depression of 1873-1896." Although
other factors also contributed to the long economic depl'.ession after 1873, such
as the entry into the world markets of massive amounts of cheap grain from
the American midwest, which sharply drove down European grain prices, the
peaking of railroad-building in Europe was certainly a central factor. 30
See the comparison between Britain and America drawn by Robert Gilpin, op. cit.
W. O. Henderson, op. cit.
2• W. W. Rostow, British Economy in the 19th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1948), p. 88. (Rostow originally developed his argument in 1938.)
•• The connections between the end of railroad expansion and the beginning of the Great
Depression are also discussed in Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire. An excellent comparative
analysis of the politics of the Great Depression is Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "International Trade,
Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," The
Journal of Inter-Disciplinary History, VIII (Autumn, 1977): 281-313. An earlier classic account is
Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in
Central Europe," Economic History Review, XIII (1943): 58-73.
27

2•
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What was the response of the British steel industry and of the bond-dealing banks of the City of London to the saturation of their former markets and
more generally to the Great Depression? Again, the first response was simply
to continue their old activity in a new place, i.e., they shifted the building and
financing of railroads from Britain and the Continent to the "regions of recent
settlement" (i.e., the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina) and to
the regions on the borders of Europe (e.g., Turkey and Egypt). In some of the
latter regions, however, the inability of weak and corrupt governments to meet
their bond payments led Britain in the 1870s and 1880s into interventions and
even annexations. Thus began the first steps toward "the new imperialism."
Of course, the factors making for "the new imperialism" were many, and
historians have developed a variety of explanations, such as strategic calculation, bureaucratic activities, and popular moods. The industrial and financial
factor, however, seems to have been an especially consistent and common
one. 31
The change that took place in the minds of some industrialists, after the
beginning of the depression in 1873, was registered by William Menelaus, a
leading steel manufacturer, in his presidential address to the British Iron and
Steel Institute in 1875:
We have but little demand from Europe, and we seem to have lost our
American market entirely.... We must, I think, frankly accept the position in which we are placed, and prepare to seek new markets for our produce in countries which, even if they have the will, have not yet the power
to impose restrictions on our trade. 32
In their new foreign policy, the steel industry had allies, of course, in the
textile industry, who were also suffering from the depression and who were
already familiar with the advantages of ''the imperialism of free trade.''
However, even the new overseas receptacles of British textiles and steel
soon reached the saturation point or at least the law of diminishing returns.
The result was a new, sharp business downturn, the depression of 1883, within
the overall Great Depression of 1873-1896. Again, the minimal response was
to expand the old activities into new countries, reinfbrcing "the new imperialism" and "the scramble for Africa" of the 1880s.
E. J. Hobsbawm summarizes this crucial choice of Britain in response to
the Great Depression:
She was too deeply committed to the technology and business organization of the first phase of industrialization, which had served her so well,
to advance enthusiastically into the new and revolutionary technology and
3 ' Various aspects of imperialism are analyzed in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, editors,
Studies in the Theory ofImperialism (London: Longman, 1972).
32 Quoted in J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the British Steel Industry (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 39.
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industrial management .... This left her with only one major way outa traditional one for Britain, though one also now adopted by competing powers-the economic (and increasingly the political) conquest of
hitherto unexploited areas of the world. In other words, imperialism. 33
The choice was in part the result of the British banking system. The
absence of strong investment and industrial banks meant that it was especially
difficult for Britain to mobilize capital for long-term equity investment in new
technologies and industries.
The second response of the British steel industry to the Great Depression
and in particular to the depression of 1883 was the building of steamships. 34
Just as the railroads brought cheap grain and meat from the hinterlands to the
ports of the regions of recent settlement, so the steamships brought them from
these ports to Britain. But these receptacles, or rather vessels, of British steel,
also soon reached the saturation point. The result was another sharp business
downturn, the depression of 1893, within the overall Great Depression.
The third response of the British steel industry to the Great Depression, in
particular to the depressions of 1883 and 1893, was again a minimal move.
Having built commercial ships, it was natural enough that the next step was to
build naval ships. The beginning of the depression of 1883 was followed by the
"navy scare" of 1884 and by a 20 percent increase in the British naval budget
in 1885, the largest increase since the Crimean War. The beginning of the
depression of 1893 was followed by another navy scare of 1893-1894 and by
another 20 percent increase in the British naval budget in 1894, regularized in
the Spencer naval program of 1894 which laid plans for further increases in the
next few years. 35 The industry journal, Iron and Coal Trades Review, observed
in March 1895 that the effect of the Admiralty program
has been to enable private firms to tide over without disaster periods of
depression that would otherwise have been extremely trying; and, naturally, we have seen that the same policy has stimulated local and provincial interest in naval affairs to a much greater extent than was formerly
the case. 36
The use of naval procurement as countercyclical policy seems to have continued even after the end of the Great Depression in 1896. The beginning of the
less severe depression of 1900-1904 was followed by another sharp increase in
the naval budget in 1901, and even the decision in 1904 to build the Dreadnought can be interpreted as another example of Keynesianism before Keynes.
•• Hobsbawm,IndustryandEmpire, p. 107.
•• Rostow, The World Economy, p. 381.
•• Data on the naval budgets of Britain and other European powers are given in Kendall D.
Moll, The Influence of History Upon Seapower, 1865-1914 (Menlo Park, California: Stanford
Research Institute, 1969).
•• Quoted in Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval
Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), p. 36.
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Thus it was that by the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain had
abandoned its industrial vocation for an imperial one. In 1851, "the workshop
of the world" had dazzled Europe with the first industrial world's fair, The
Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace. Fifty years later, the scene was just as
splendid but rather different:
Never were instruments of war so gleaming with brass, so brilliant of
paintwork, so stately with ensigns and bugle-calls and white canvas. The
fleet which, in 1901, King Edward VII reviewed at Spithead at the close of
the Victorian era offered perhaps the most gorgeous spectacle of power
Europe has ever seen: the ships were painted in black, white and yellow,
and fluttered all over with signal flags and pennants, and from their topmasts flew gigantic White Ensigns and crosses of St. George, and their
crews jauntily linked the decks, and their officers majestically saluted
from their high bridges, and through the line of warships came the King
of England in his royal yacht, the largest steam yacht in the worldstandard at the mainmast, duty officers at attention on the foredeck, a
wispy stream of smoke from two bright yellow funnels, and beneath the
cheers of the assembled crews and the successive melodies of the battleship bands, the soft greased thump of reciprocating engines from impeccable engine-rooms below. 37
The British steel industry now faced vigorous competition in its colonial
and even home markets from the more efficient German and American steel
industries. The emerging British electrical and chemical industries,
underdeveloped because of the foreign orientation of the British financial
system, also faced vigorous competition from their more efficient German and
American counterparts, nourished and guided by investment and industrial
banks. More broadly, the small island-state serving as the head of a far-flung,
loosely-knit, sea-borne empire faced vigorous strategic competition from Germany and America as two great continential powers. The liberal vision of free
trade and free capital movements in a world arena was nearing exhaustion, or
at least bringing about the industrial and strategic exhaustion of Britain while
preserving the prosperity of the City of London.
For a brief moment, British heavy industry put forward an alternative
vision of the British future. It did so under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, a leader of the Conservative Party and a former mayor of Birmingham,
the center of the British steel industry. 38 Chamberlain and his supporters proposed that Britain erect tariff walls around much of its empire and that the
dominions be compensated with greater participation in political decision
making in London-imperial preference and imperial federation. The result
James Morris, "A View of the Royal Navy," Encounter XL (March 1973): 20.
Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought
1895-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).
37
38
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would be a British world power with industrial and strategic strength equal to
or greater than that of Germany and America. And together these three great
"Saxon" powers would essentially divide much of the world into three spheres
of influence and would no longer pursue conflicts of interest between
themselves.
The defeat of British heavy industry and of Chamberlain's vision,
finalized in the Liberal electoral victory of 1906, was probably over-determined. A key role in the new imperial order would have been played by
Canada. But many Canadian economic interests wanted access to cheap
American capital-goods, and by this time there were some Canadian
industrialists who wanted their own tariff walls against all foreign goods,
including British ones. But the decisive attack on the industrial and imperial
vision came from within Britain itself and was organized by the banks of the
City of London which wanted to maintain the benefits from being the center
of a system of free movement of goods and capital with the world as its arena.
The banks were supported by many within its old ally, the textile industry, who
still believed they could compete in cotton textiles. The long hegemony of the
banking system in British politics meant that this particular tale of two cities,
of London and Birmingham, would not have a surprise ending.
The British steel industry was not strong enough, then, to displace the
liberal vision and to impose its own. It was strong enough, however, to exact
compensation in the form of renewed naval procurement and to justify the
grand new battleships by pointing to the German menace in the years down to
1914.

Other nations also turned to vigorous state action during the Great
Depression of 1873-1896 and later, in order to maintain their steel industries
and the returns to capital in them.
France
Like its British counterpart, the French steel industry also was afflicted by
the Great Depression of 1873-1876. The first response was, as we have already
suggested, the state-supported expansion of the French railroad network
under the Freycinet Plan of 1878. A second response was similar to that of
Britain, a search for overseas markets. Jules Ferry, who had long represented
the iron and steel industry of Eastern France, initiated an annexationist
colonial policy when he was Premier in 1881. But this colonial policy was
somewhat premature and was only fitfully pursued in the 1880s, when the major thrust of state policy was the completion of the railroad network.
What happened after the French railroads were built? The depression of
1892. One response to this new downturn was the famous Meline Tariff of that
year, the first high French customs barrier since before 1860. Another
response was a reinvigorated colonial policy which lasted until the eve of
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World War I. But the most substantial response was to build and finance railroads in Russia with French equipment and capital and to buttress this grand
railroad undertaking with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. 39
Germany
The German steel industry and its associated industrial banks also were
afflicted by the Great Depression. But the actions of the German state not only
combined the various measures of the British and the French but included
some innovative measures of its own.
The first response was a minimal move, the tariff of 1879. This tariff was
a central component of the coalition between German industrialists and
Junker agrarians, "the marriage between iron and rye," and 1879 has been
called the Second Founding of the Second Empire. In the same year, the
Anti-Socialist Law was enacted. And at about the same time, the state undertook the legal enforcement of cartel agreements to limit production and maintain prices. 40
Yet tariff and cartel protection alone could not prevent the saturation of
the steel industry's German markets, and Germany also experienced the
depression of 1883. Germany then turned rather tentatively to what had been
the first response of Britain, a search for overseas markets. Bismarck initiated
a colonial policy in 1884, one which was not vigorously sustained. Bismarck
also initiated a 20 percent increase in the German naval budget in the same
year. The return of depression in 1890 was followed by a 60 percent increase in
the German naval budget of 1891. The Germans, like the British before them,
anticipated Keynes. The depressions of 1901 and 1908 were also followed
quickly by unusual increases in the German naval budget. 41 At the same time,
diplomatic efforts promoted foreign railroads, especially the Baghdad Railway, which were built with German steel and capital but which posed a threat
to British economic and strategic interests.
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the steel industries of
both Britain and Germany were focused on the building of warships, and the
Anglo-German naval race was on. As the years went on, the naval race took
on a reciprocal dynamic of its own. But it is interesting to note that most major
jumps in the British and the German naval budgets occurred in a year or two
after a downturn in the business cycle.
•• Cameron, op. cit., and Fran~ois Caron, "French Railroad Investment, 1850-1914," in
Essays in French Economic History, Rondo Cameron, editor (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, 1970), pp. 315-340.
40 On this coalition between industrialists and Junkers, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and
Democracy in Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943); also V. R. Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
•• Moll, op. cit., The classic analysis of the political economy of German naval procurement is
Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany 1894-1901 (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1975). (Kehr's book was originally published in Germany in 1930.) Also see
Berghahn, op. cit.
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The Anglo-German naval race did not in itself lead to World War I. It
did, however, place a barrier to any enduring Anglo-German detente, and it
did lead to the Anglo-French naval entente of 1904. All of this, in turn, loaded
the dice toward the particular form the alliance system took by 1914.
One other German response to saturation in old industries was more innovative, however, and that was the creation of two new capital-goods industries, electricity and chemicals. The German industrial banks facilitated
such industrial innovation. State measures also provided important support,
especially the funding of technical and science education, the reform of
municipal government to provide financial security for urban electric railroads
and electric power systems, and, of course, military and naval procurement of
explosives manufactured by the chemical industry. 42

Italy
The Italian steel industry was largely constructed in the 1900s. Even more
than the preceding steel industries it was dependent upon state contracts and
guarantees. Almost immediately, it became a major force for a vigorous
foreign policy to achieve railroad concessions in the Balkans (especially, and
rather pathetically, in Montenegro and Albania) and in the Ottoman Empire,
and a force for a major buildup of the Italian navy. 43 Indeed, in the last years
before World War I, there was something of a railroad war between Italy and
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. It was this rivalry which gradually separated
Italy from its cooperation with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple
Alliance, and it was this search for new coloniaLterritories to the East which
drove Italy into the War on the side of the Triple Entente of Britain, France,
and Russia in 1915.

The foreign export and military procurement phases recycled:
from World War I to the Great Depression of 1929
On the morrow of World War I, the steel industries of Europe and also of
America, were again faced with the old problem: how to keep themselves in
business, after the period of postwar reconstruction came to its inevitable end.
There was a choice of several paths.

Britain
The British, in keeping with their practice of the minimal move, of
muddling through, for the most part chose simply to do more of the same.
They retained their overseas empire after the war, and thus they could con•2 W. 0. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834-1914 (Berkeley: Univer~ity of
California Press, 1975).
43 R. A.
Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy, 1908-1915 (Berkeley: University, of
California Press, 1975).
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tinue to build railroads to span their colonies, steamships to service them, and
warships to defend them, i.e., they could continue in each of their three
responses to the Great Depression of 1873-1896. In addition, however, they at
last began the transition to a new leading sector. Having based much of their
earlier industrialization. on textiles and having had high earnings from foreign
trade and investment, the British had, more than other European countries, a
consumer-oriented economy and high per capita income. Accordingly, they
possessed in 1920 the second largest (after the Americans) automobile industry
in the world, and this experienced a slow but steady growth during the 1920s.

France
The French recapitulated the British pattern, but in a reduced form.
Before the war, their empire, their earnings from textile (especially woolen) exports, and their earnings from foreign investment had each been second only
to Britain's. After the war, they too poured the output of their steel industry
into more colonial railroads, steamships, and warships and also into a small
automobile industry, which nevertheless was the third largest automobile industry in the world.

Germany
The Germans, having lost the war and having remained a country without
a strong consumer goods sector, had in 1920 neither an overseas empire nor an
automobile industry. For the German steel industry, consequently, there
seemed to be only two feasible paths, and these were mutually reinforcing.
One was renewed armaments production. The other was exports of steel
products to markets in Eastern Europe and, relatedly, gaining control over the
growing and competing steel industries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Throughout the 1920s, the steel industry supported those political parties
which in turn supported rearmament, revision of the Treaty of Versailles,
tariff barriers against Western Europe, and German domination of Eastern
Europe. Its favorite political vehicle was the National People's Party, led by
Alfred Hugenberg. 44 The steel industry was joined in its support by the Junker
agrarians, making the National People's Party a renewal of the old marriage
of iron and rye. The Junkers, imbued with military traditions and threatened
by cheap grain imports from Poland, had their own reasons for rearmament,
revision of Versailles, and domination of Eastern Europe.
44 The politics of the German steel industry during the 1920s are discussed in Gerald D.
Feldman, Iron and Steel in the German Inflation, 1916-1923 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977); Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany,
and Italy in the Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and
David Abraham, Inter-Class Conflict and the Formation of Ruling Class Consensus in Late
Weimar Germany (Doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of
Chicago, December 1977).
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By the 1920s, however, the German economic scene included two other
leading sectors, the chemical industry and the electrical industry, and these had
a very different political tendency. The German chemical industry was the
second largest and the most advanced chemical industry in the world. (Its
leading enterprise, I. G. Farben, was the world's largest chemical corporation
and the largest corporation of any in Europe.) 45 This meant that the chemical
industry had a strong interest in free trade or at least in conditions which encouraged exports. The same was true of the German electrical industry which
was the largest and the most advanced electrical industry in Europe. And since
the largest and best markets for chemical and electrical products were other
advanced industrial economies, these two industries were vitally interested in
good relations with Western Europe. This led them to support those political
parties which in turn supported "fulfillment" of the Versailles Treaty and the
concluding of the Locarno Treaty of 1925 between Germany and its Western
neighbors. Conversely, they were basically indifferent to Eastern Europe in the
1920s (and there was never an "Eastern Locarno"). The favorite political
vehicle of the chemical and industrial industries was the German People's
Party, led by Gustav Stresemann. 46
In addition to their interest in free trade, the chemical and electrical industries also had an interest in promoting mass consumption and therefore in
supporting social welfare and democratic politics. I. G. Farben, encouraged
by the widespread consensus among experts in the 1920s that world petroleum
supplies would soon be exhausted, diverted most of its new capital investments
into building enormous plants to produce gasoline from coal by a process
known as hydrogenation. 47 It thus acquired a strong interest in the development of a large German automobile industry. Similarly, the German electrical
industry, a producer of consumer durables and municipal electrical equipment, also had a strong interest in social welfare and municipal services. These
features led the industries into supporting parliamentary coalitions which included the Social Democratic Party. In brief, then, the Weimar Republic, with
its foreign policy of "fulfillment" and its domestic policy of social welfare,
was in many ways based upon a coalition of chemistry, electricity, and labor in
opposition to the coalition of iron and rye. 48
The Weimar system was in an unstable equilibrium, however. Its major
leader, Stresemann, died in October 1929. At the same time, the New York
stock market crash marked the beginning of a new Great Depression. The
American responses to the economic crisis had momentous consequences for
45 On I. G. Farben, see Frank A. Howard, Buna Rubber: The Birth of an Industry (New York:
D. Van Nostrand, 1947); and Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (New
York: The Free Press, 1978), an informative and perceptive industrial history, which goes beyond
the connotations of its title.
46 The politics of the German chemical and electrical industries during the 1920s are discussed by
Maier, op. cit., and Abraham, op. cit.
47 Howard, op. cit.; Borkin, op. cit., chapter 2.
48 Abraham, op. cit., presents a thorough and sophisticated demonstration of this argument.
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Germany. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 led to the raising of tariff barriers in other countries, dealing a serious blow to the free trade policies of the
German chemical and electrical industries. In addition, the drying up of
American loans to Germany broke a crucial link in the international economic
chain which had lifted up German prosperity in the 1920s (American loans to
Germany - German reparations to Britain and France - British and French
imports from Germany). These two developments meant that the free trade
option, the Westpolitik, of the chemical and electrical industries suddenly
became far less viable. And they meant in turn that the coercive trade option,
the Ostpolitik, of the steel industry suddenly became most attractive. Finally,
the depression-induced sharp drop in world oil prices in 1930-1931 and the
opening up of the vast East Texas oil field in 1931 meant that I. G. Farben,
with its enormous investments in hydrogenation plants, was suddenly threatened by massive imports of cheap American oil, much as the Junker agrarians
had suddenly been threatened by massive imports of cheap American grain
sixty years before. For I. G. Farben, the only solution to the Texan problem
was a German government which would be strong enough and willing enough
to guarantee a market for its coal-based gasoline, by erecting tariff barriers,
by granting subsidies, by buying the gasoline itself, and by legitimating the
vast expenditures entailed with an ideology of economic autarky and military
preparedness-Le., the same ideology promoted by the steel industry and the
grain producers. 49
Together, these new developments in the world market propelled the
chemical and electrical industries during 1932 from political opposition into
political cooperation with the steel industry and the grain producers. And as
the National People's Party under Hugenberg proved insufficiently popular to
win the several elections of 1932, first the steel industry and then the chemical
and electrical industries shifted their financial support to the National Socialist
Party under Hitler. 50 With the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933, the
foreign policy of the steel industry-rearmament, revision of Versailles, high
tariffs, and domination of Eastern Europe-became the foreign policy of the
new Germany.

Italy
The German experience had had an earlier and a simpler trial run in Italy.
Of all the European steel industries before World War I, the Italian had been
the most dependent upon armaments contracts. It was, therefore, unusually
vulnerable to a period of peace, especially one in which the peace treaties, like
49

Borkin, op. cit., chapter 3.

•o Abraham, op. cit.; Borkin, op. cit., chapter 3. On the industrial role in the 1932 elections,

also see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, revised edition (New York: Harper and Row,
1964). An earlier, classic account of the relations between industry and the Nazis is Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Process ofNational Socialism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1942).
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Versailles, gave Italy no substantial territories on which new railroads could be
laid. The inevitable postwar economic depression hit Italy in 1921 especially
hard. Accordingly, the steel industrialists supported popular movements
demanding revision of "the mutilated peace" and the annexation of new territories. The major such movement, the Fascists, achieved power in 1922. 51
But Italy's efforts at territorial expansion would have to wait for more than a
decade until the new Great Depression produced a diplomatic constellation of
the greater powers which was more favorable to Italian aims.
We have seen the range of the different countries' responses. Given the
historical British response to the combination of the Great Depression of
1873-1896 and the German naval buildup of the 1890s, one might have
thought that the British response to the new Great Depression and the German
rearmament of the 1930s would have been similar, i.e., British rearmament.
But, of course, this was not the case. Instead, the actual British response was
rather like Joseph Chamberlain's program of the early 1900s, i.e., imperial
preference and appeasement of the Germans.
Part of the explanation lies ironically in the continuing hegemony of the
British system of commercial banks operating in a world arena, of the same
City of London that had defeated the Chamberlain program thirty years
before. In "the terrible year" of 1931, there were massive runs on the pound
and on the British commercial banks, and the government installed emergency
capital controls. But the City of London needed to return as soon as possible
to free movements of capital. The lesson that had been learned in 1931 was
that the pound was now vulnerable in the face of even slight economic and
political disturbances. A small sign of inflation or a small decline in the
balance of trade could lead to a new run on the pound and a new financial collapse.
In domestic affairs, this meant that Britain could not increase consumer-demand to the point that the wages of skilled labor were bid up,
resulting in inflation, or that more raw materials were imported, resulting in a
decline in the balance of trade. Thus Britain went through the 1930s with the
government making no serious efforts at eliminating unemployment through
Keynesian measures promoting mass consumption. 52 In colonial affairs, the
extreme sensitivity toward the balance of trade meant that orderly, predictable
markets for British exports were now highly valued. Thus, the City of London
was now willing to accept imperial preference, formalized in the Ottawa
Agreements of 1932.
In foreign affairs, the consequences were even more moment9us. Just as
the wage or raw-material dynamic could be detonated by government-induced
consumer spending, so could it be detonated by government-ordered defense
spending, i.e., rearmament. The City of London, haunted by the ghost of
51 Roland Sarti, Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1971).
• 2 Donald
Winch, Economics and Politics: A Historical Study (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1%9).
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1931, imposed a low ceiling upon rearmament efforts and thus a narrow scope
upon British foreign policy. In every diplomatic confrontation with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the 1930s, British foreign policy was severely constrained by the immediate need to prevent a foreign exchange crisis and by the
military weakness resulting from minimal rearmament efforts. When Neville
Chamberlain, the son of Joseph Chamberlain, moved from being Chancellor
of the Exchequer to being Prime Minister in 1937, he was determined to accept
these financial realities and to act accordingly in a coherent and systematic
way. The result was his foreign policy of Appeasement. 53
These, then, were the various responses of the different European nations
to the continuing problems of saturation in their steel industries in the years
following World War I. There was, however, yet another possible response,
and that was to develop fully a massive new leading sector, in particular the
automobile industry, and to pour steel into it. And this was the path taken by
the United States.

The political tendency of the automobile industry

The domestic growth phase
The impact of an automobile industry upon an economy is so great that it
is justifiable to see the creation of that industry as a new stage in the industrialization of a country.
It was the Americans, who with an almost single-minded intensity, first
took this path. On the eve of the innovation of the automobile, the United
States already had developed the most consumer-oriented economy and the
highest per capita income in the world. It also included a large class of prosperous, independent farmers, many exporting to European markets, who were
separated by long distances from their market towns and from each other and
who provided a perfect market for the automobile. It is not surprising,
therefore, that even before World War I, the United States possessed the
largest automobile industry in the world, both in terms of absolute numbers of
cars produced and in terms of cars per capita (about one car per thirty-five
persons in 1914). 54
The "start-up costs" for automobile production were actually rather low,
as long as a manufacturer was interested in producing only a few cars. Thus,
manufacturers of bicycles and buggies could rather easily convert to
automobiles. However, the advent of mass-production and assembly-line
techniques meant that success would go to companies that could raise enormous amounts of capital, either through their profits (Ford) or through out53 Robert Paul Shay, Jr., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1977).
•• On the early developments of the automobile industry in the United States, see James J.
Flink, The Car Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I. T. Press, 1975).
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side financing. One of the heroic moments of American capitalism was the
decision by the Du Ponts, who had accumulated massive profits producing
munitions for World War I (and who were confronted with a massive collapse
of their markets with the advent of peace), to finance a struggling automobile
company, which in 1919 had little grand about it except its name-General
Motors. By 1926, General Motors was the world's largest automobile company.
The boom in the American automobile industry in the 1920s fueled the
more general boom in the American economy, ''the New Era.'' As steel
poured into automobiles (30 percent of American steel production went into
automobiles by the mid-1920s), the steel industry was released from the need
for armaments contracts. There was therefore no leading American industry
with an interest in "foreign entanglements" or a "military-industrial complex." The Washington Naval Conference of 1922, with its limitation on
capital ships, registered this American shift from ships to cars, from the Great
White Fleet to the black Model T, from manifest destiny to consumer
sovereignty. The American automobile industry provided the motor behind
the foreign policy of isolationism.
By 1929, there was one automobile for every five persons in the United
States and given the existing structure of the distribution of income, the
domestic market seemed to have reached saturation. Production of
automobiles in the United States reached a peak in the spring of 1929. The
clear leveling off of this massive leading sector was a major factor in the New
York stock market crash six months later and in the ensuing Great Depression
in the United States. 55

The foreign export phase and the foreign investment phase
By analogy with the British pattern of 1873-1896, after the railroads were
built, one would expect that one response of the American automobile industry to the saturation of its domestic market would have been to expand its
foreign operations, that is, the foreign export and the foreign investment
phases of the product cycle. And indeed some of this occurred. The export
drive of American automobiles was aborted, however, by tariff walls raised by
foreign countries in response to the record-high Smoot-Hawley Tariff, imposed by the United States in 1930 under pressure from the American textile,
steel, and other older industries. In regard to foreign investment, Ford had
begun manufacturing operations in Britain and Germany in the early 1920s;
General Motors had begun manufacturing operations in Germany in 1929. By
1936, of the cars produced in Germany, 40 percent were produced by GM's
subsidiary, Opel (the largest automobile producer in Germany), and 10 percent
•• Useful accounts of the causes of the Great Depression of 1929-1939 are given in Derek H.
Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977); and Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973).
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were produced by Ford. But the real era of direct foreign investment by the
American automobile industry was to come only after World War II, a war
which, among other things, made the world safe for consumer sovereignty.
Europe did not really move into its "auto-industrial age" 56 until after
World War II. In 1935, Britain had only one automobile per twenty persons,
France one per thirty-five, Germany one per hundred, and Italy one per
two-hundred. In contrast the European countries would not reach the U.S.
figure of one for every five people until the 1960s. 57
How were the large amounts of capital for automobile industrialization
mobilized in Europe after World War II? One method, analogous to the
capital formation for steel and railroads in Britain, France, and Italy decades
before, was through the export of manufactured products developed in an
earlier stage, i.e., "export-led growth." Here, an important factor was not
only the high quality of the products, but the low wages of European labor
(relative to the United States) in the two decades after the end of the war. No
authoritarian regime was required to repress wages in Europe. The low expectations of union membership, deriving from the privation of World War II,
and the political divisions in union organization, deriving from the anti-communism of the Cold War, were for many years the functional equivalent of
wage-repression. The role performed in some Latin American countries by
their own armies through authoritarian rule, according to the model of
Guillermo O'Donnell, was performed in Europe by the ghost of the German
Army and the spectre of the Russian Army.
A second method, analogous to the earlier mobilization of capital for railroads in Italy and Spain, was through the import of foreign funds. Until the
mid-1950s, this involved U.S. government aid (i.e., the Marshall Plan), and
from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s it involved massive American direct
investment in the European automobile industry. Even in the late 1940s,
General Motors and Ford owned a large share of the European industry, and
in the 1950s the American automobile industry entered into the foreign investment phase of its product cycle on a large scale. The American automobile corporations first undertook large manufacturing investment in Britain, then
West Germany, and then France. Normally, when a country of more than
20 million people has reached a certain level of economic development
(roughly $1,000 per capita GNP in 1965 dollars) it has developed a market in
consumer durables which is large and prosperous enough to attract large-scale
direct investment in manufacturing by the American automobile corporations.
And since European labor was relatively self-restrained in its wage demands,
the continued flow of American direct investment also did not require the
labor-repressive policies of an authoritarian regime. Of course,
•• The phrase is from Emma Rothschild, Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto-Industrial Age
(New York: Random House, 1973).
57 W. W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971), pp. 227-229.
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labor-repressive policies and authoritarian regimes did not inhibit the flow of
foreign direct investment in Europe either, as was demonstrated by multinational automobile corporations when they undertook large manufacturing
investments in Spain as that country rolled over the $1,000 threshold in the late
1960s.
Although the automobile industries of Britain, West Germany, France,
and finally Spain were built up in part with American direct investment, the
automobile industry in Italy was built up independently of it. The dominant
automobile corporation in Italy, Fiat, had long differed from the other European automobile corporations in that it was a giant and profitable conglomerate which produced locomotives, aircraft, and other machinery, as well
as automobiles. Other Italian automobile producers were owned or financed
by the state.
Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy finally entered "the autoindustrial age'' in the 1950s. The automobile boom of the 1950s-1960s in these
countries was at the core of their more general economic prosperity and
growth at that time. As many political analysts have observed, this general
economic prosperity and growth contributed to the legitimation of the European liberal-democratic systems, to the deradicalization of the European
working class, and to the demarxification in the late 1950s of the programs of
the British and West German Socialist parties, which had a large working class
constituency. The particular features of the automobile boom further contributed to the deradicalization of the European working class by inducing a
shift from community activities to individual consumption.
The growth of the automobile industry was especially rapid and pronounced in the ex-Axis countries of Germany and Italy (and also Japan). Not
surprisingly, the liberal domestic economic policies of these three countries in
the 1950s and 1960s, the sort of policies natural to a confident capitalism
engaged in a great boom, closely resembled the liberal domestic economic
policies of the United States in the 1920s, the time of the first great boom in
American automobile production. 58 In these countries, working class parties
did not participate at all in the governments during the 1950s and 1960s, until
in West Germany in 1966 recession brought the Socialists into a "Grand Coalition" with the Christian Democrats.
At the time that Europe underwent its postwar automobile boom, the
United States also experienced a renewed expansion, a second wind, in its
automobile industry, supported in part by the Keynesian fiscal policies of the
Federal government, the Federal highway program, and the Federal home
mortgage program which encouraged suburbanization.
By the early 1970s, the ratio of cars to persons in Britain, France, West
Germany, and Italy had reached about the American level of 1929, just before
•• European economic policies in the 1950s and 1960s are discussed by Andrew Shonfield,
Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969).
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the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s. What happened after these
European automobile industries reached the saturation points of their
domestic markets? One result contributed to the economic recession and
stagnation of 1974-1978. Of course the causes of the economic troubles of the
last few years in Europe are many, but the saturation of the automobile
market in Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy suggests that there is little
basis for a sustained recovery unless, like the French, governments engage in
what the Germans have called strukturpo/itik, that is, the conscious creation
of new leading industrial sectors and the consequent recasting of the nation's
industrial structure. A product-cycle theorist would predict that the Europeans would adopt as their new (or renewed) sectors those same industries
which were the American new sectors a decade or a generation ago, i.e., aerospace, computers, telecommunications, and nuclear power. And this would
explain the intensity of the French export drive in aerospace and the French
and German export drive in nuclear power since 1975.
The automobile industries of Spain and Brazil (now ranking about
seventh and eighth in size) have developed in a rather different way from those
in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan. First,
in these six earlier automobile industrializers, at least one large automobile
corporation was indigenous to the country; indeed, in the United States, Italy,
and Japan, foreign corporations have accounted for almost none of the production. In these earlier industrializers, the concept of the "national champion" against foreign competition has been plausible. In Spain and Brazil, in
contrast, there has been no such large indigenous automobile corporation. All
large producers are foreign multinationals or closely associated with them.
Second, in Britain, France, and West Germany, the multinational
presence has been largely American; in Spain and Brazil, it has been multinational, including various European and Japanese corporations. In the
1960s, corporations such as Leyland, Renault, Volkswagen, Fiat, and Toyota
entered into the direct foreign investment phase of their own product cycles.
Third, Spain and Brazil have been the first societies to undertake mass
production and consumption of automobiles within an authoritarian political
system. But the political consequences of coexistence between the autoindustrial age and an authoritarian regime have been different in the two countries.
In Spain, the multinational automobile corporations pushed the governments after Franco's death in 1975 toward the liberalization and even
democratization of the political system. The major reason was that
automobiles produced in Spain would be very competitive within the European Common Market if Spain were a member. Spain in the late 1970s could
be as cost-effective in automobiles as Italy was in the early 1960s, because
Spain today holds roughly the relative wage position that Italy held then. But
the Common Market would not admit Spain into membership until, in the
words of a resolution passed by each of its main institutions in 1975, "freedom
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and democracy have been established in Spain.'' (Indeed, given the
self-interest of French and Italian farmers, it may not admit Spain even now.)
In Brazil, and in the absence of the special inducements provided by an international organization which is both a common market and a democratic
community, the political consequences of the multinational automobile corporations have been in the opposite direction. In the last two years of the
Goulart government of the early 1960s, foreign investment in Brazilian
manufacturing declined sharply. Among the economic, bureaucratic, and
technocratic elites of Brazil, it was a plausible argument that an authoritarian
regime was a necessary condition for the renewed flow of foreign investment
and a fortiori for the expanding flow which was necessary for the leap into the
next stage of industrialization. And, in fact, in the years after the military coup
of 1964, American and European investment did pour into Brazil; the output
of the automobile industry doubled between 1964 and 1970 and doubled again
between 1970 and 1974. However, the foreign investment in the Brazilian
automobile industry was somewhat anomalous. Whereas the per capita GNP
in other host countries for multinational automobile corporations had been
above $1,000, the per capita GNP of Brazil in 1966 was only $340. This made
for a rather thin automobile market, despite Brazil's large population. This
"premature" foreign investment in the Brazilian automobile industry was
clearly induced by the political stability, repression of labor unions, and low
wages which were imposed by the authoritarian regime established after the
military coup of 1964.
Since Brazil had and continues to have a much lower per capita GNP than
other large automobile producers, the greatly-increased consumption of
automobiles in Brazil required a special form of income redistribution, that is,
redistribution to the middle class from the lower classes. This has been accomplished through government measures which repressed working-class real
wages, reduced welfare and public health programs, increased
middle-class real salaries, and provided government credit for automobile
purchases. 59 These policies, which were necessary for a premature autoindustrial age, could be imposed far more easily by an authoritarian government than by a liberal-democratic one. The calculations of the Brazilian
regime were suggested in 1974 by its Finance Minister, Mario Henrique Simsonsen:
A transfer of income from the richest 20 percent to the poorest 80 percent
probably would increase the demand for food, but diminish the demand
for automobiles. The result of a sudden redistribution would be merely to
generate inflation in the food-producing sector and excess capacity in the
car industry. 60
•• Edmar L. Bacha, "Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic Growth" (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion
Papers, 1976).
•• Quoted in Norman Gall, "The Rise of Brazil," Commentary 63 (Januar)' 1977): 49-50.
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When the military sought to legitimize its rule, its principal argument was
the success of Brazilian industrialization and the greatly-increased consumption of consumer durables, especially automobiles. Of course, even without
the multinational automobile industry, there probably would still have been a
military coup in Brazil in 1964 and an authoritarian regime. But the stability of
the authoritarian regime was probably due to the course of the automobile
industry.
A product-cycle theorist would also have a ready explanation for the U.S.
foreign policy of detente with the Soviet Union during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. It was just at the end of the 1960s that the American automobile
corporations, which had recently invested heavily in Southern Europe and the
more developed parts of Latin America, were searching for the area with the
next highest level of economic development, which, of course, was Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. The SALT I (1972) and Vladivostok (1974) arms
agreements were skillfully designed so as to create simultaneously an atmosphere for detente (desired by the American automobile industry and by
American international banks) and a ratification of increased production of
strategic missiles (desired by the American aerospace industry, which in the
late 1960s also entered into a period of economic decline). Thus Henry Kissinger accomplished his own Reinsurance Treaty with the Russians, as Bismarck had done in 1887; at the same time, Kissinger prevented the disruption
of the established foreign policy consensus between autos and aerospace, his
own "marriage between iron and rye.''
Kissinger's achievement was as brilliant as Bismarck's, but it was even
more brief. By 1975, the American automobile industry had rediscovered that
operations in communist countries usually entailed problems which outweighed the profits. And by 1977, American and European international
banks had loaned some $50 billion to communist countries, and the banks had
perceived that this was about the limit of the countries' capacity for orderly
repayment. The American industrial and financial interests supporting detente
were now much diminished. It is not surprising that the American political
figures supporting detente were too.
At about the same time, the great increase in the world price of oil, as a
result of OPEC's actions in what has been called the "October Revolution" of
1973, led Soviet authorities to reduce the growth of the Soviet automobile
industry. The "auto-industrial age" of the Soviet Union remains on an
ever-receding horizon, and the Soviet ideal remains what it has been since the
October Revolution of 1917, a great monument to the leading sectors of the
Europe of sixty years ago-steel, chemicals, electricity, and armaments.

Conclusions
It could be ~rgued that the long era during which leading industrial sectors
had an impact upon political outcomes has come to its end. For by now the
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advanced industrial nations are populated with many industrial sectors, and
probably never again will one industry alone so dominate these countries as the
textile, steel, and automobile industries each did in its time. But our review of
the last two centuries also has noted times when political outcomes were
shaped not by one sector but by conflicts and coalitions between several, for
example, Britain in the 1900s and Germany in the 1920s. The political outcomes of the next decade similarly may be shaped by conflicts between protectionist industries (textiles, steel, recently chemicals) and free trade ones (aerospace, computers, telecommunications), with a swing position being held by
the automobile industry, whose interests are divided and conflicting. The long
hegemony of the free trade coalition, dating from World War II, may be nearing an end as particular industries and corporations are driven by poor competitiveness in the world market (by phase 4 of Vernon's product cycle), into
the protectionist camp. One political consequence would be the eroding of the
Atlantic Alliance and of its military organization, NATO, at the very time that
the Soviet Union has carried out a large buildup of its military forces in
Europe. As the 1890s and the 1930s suggest, a time of protectionist hegemony
is unlikely to be an enlightened one.
There is an alternative path and that would be for one country, most
probably the United States, to undertake the development of new industrial
sectors. Since a new American industry would be likely to create and to
dominate for a time an international market for its product, it would be a
powerful ally and reinforcement for the now dwindling free trade coalition.
And the hegemony of free trade, of ''interdependence,'' might experience a
renewal and second wind.
What might be one such new industry in the United States? Here, we
might find some clues in the past. Two of our earlier leading sectors, railroads
and automobiles, plus another major industry, aerospace, were successive improvements in transportation. 61 But, as the history of the Concorde suggests,
improvements in transportation may have reached the limits possible within
the technological frameworks of the old industries. The next logical leap is to
move not bodies but minds, i.e., to improve not transportation but communication. This suggests that an obvious candidate for the next great leap
forward is the telecommunications industry. It is an even more obvious candidate since the higher cost of petroleum has in part eroded the economic base of
the automobile and aerospace industries. And indeed corporations such as
IBM, ITT, and RCA are now poised to undertake a number of significant
innovations in visual and computer telecommunications. For such innova• 1 I have discussed the American aerospace industry in a number of places, including my "Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in American Defense Policy, Richard
G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, editors, third edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973), pp. 626-640; "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy 2 (Summer 1973):
33-56; and statement and testimony on American defense production in Defense Industrial Base:
DOD Procurement Practices, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Defense Production,
Congress of the United States, 95th Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1977), pp. 63-90.
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tions, the main barrier may well be not the lack of capital but the threat of
government regulation, which would preserve the sunk investment of the old
established corporation in the industry, A. T .&T. 62
Will the 1980s see a great telecommunications boom fueling a general
economic boom like the great railroad, automobile, and aerospace booms of
the past? It is not easy to see the shape of such a development, just as it was
not easy to see the shapes of the earlier developments on their eve. But a great
telecommunications industrial sector would have implications for military
power and international politics as well as for international trade. Today, the
liberal democracies of the United States and Western Europe find themselves
unable to mobilize the vast financial resources required to match the Soviet
Union and its European allies tank-for-tank and plane-for-plane, and unwilling to demoralize themselves through a total dependence upon nuclear
weapons. But out of a massive telecommunications industry would issue the
inventions and innovations for a new kind of weapons systems and military
defense, of which existing "precision-guided munitions," "smart bombs,"
and "automated battlefields" are only premonitions. And these would be
weapons systems in which the technologically-advanced liberal democracies of
NATO would have both an absolute and a comparative advantage. 63 And once
again, innovation of new industrial sectors, "gales of creative destruction,"
would prove to be the basis, and perhaps the necessary condition, for the conservation of old and worthy political institutions.
62 On the issue of innovation and regulation, see Competition in the Telecommunications
Industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 94th Congress (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977).
63 On the implications of these new military technologies, see James Digby, Precision-Guided
Weapons, Adelphi Papers, no. 118 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Summer 1975); and Richard Burt, New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions, Adelphi
Papers, no. 126 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1976).
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